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Abstract We present a thorough experimental and formal
analysis of users’ privacy in mobile telephony systems. In
particular, we experimentally analyse the use of pseudonyms
and point out weak deployed policies leading to some critical
scenarios which make it possible to violate a user’s privacy.
We also expose some protocol’s vulnerabilities resulting in
breaches of the anonymity and/or user unlinkability.We show
these breaches translate in actual attacks which are feasible
to implement on real networks and discuss our prototype
implementation. In order to countermeasure these attacks,we
propose realistic solutions. Finally,weprovide the theoretical
framework for the automatic verification of the unlinkability
and anonymity of the fixed 2G/3G procedures and automat-
ically verify them using the ProVerif tool.
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1 Introduction
Mobile phones of the latest generation are relatively small but
powerful devices that we keep always on and carry wherever
we go. We rely more and more on services and apps running
on them not only to make calls but to organize and enhance
our daily life as well. For this reason, mobile phones are usu-
ally equipped with a variety of sensors and communication
devices able to collect and/or communicate context-aware
and personal data. This data collection and exchange activ-
ity take place even when the user is not aware of it. Hence,
the user is often oblivious of potential security and privacy
threats deriving from the use of these technologies and has
little or no control over the generation, sharing and use of
the data itself. Therefore, along with the benefits, the ubiqui-
tous presence of smart, context-aware sensing and computing
devices brings with it various concerns, mainly related to the
security and privacy properties of such systems.
It is difficult to ensure that a system satisfies the desired
security properties. The properties have to be formally
defined. Every possible interaction of the adversary with the
system has to be considered. The information the attacker
gains from the execution of the system and the knowledge
he can infer from it should be taken into account. This
involves both careful scrutiny of the cryptographic prim-
itives and of the protocol message flow. Formal methods
have proved to be effective in highlighting weaknesses of
protocols and hence enabling designers and programmers
to patch them and strengthen their security guarantees, as
well as in giving strong assurance on the properties a proto-
col achieves by proving the absence of attacks undermining
the stated security properties. For example, conference man-
agement [1], electronic voting [2–4], single-sign-on [5,6],
cloud storage [7], RFID [8], TPM [9,10] and mobile tele-
phony protocols [11] have been scrutinized using manual
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and automatic verification techniques. Manual proof meth-
ods are lengthy and error prone, while automatic verification
tools have to compromise in order to achieve decidability (at
least for some subclass of processes) by bounding the num-
ber of agents and sessions and/or restricting the considered
class of cryptographic functions.
Many of the security properties of mobile telephony
systems can be modelled and analysed in terms of the classi-
cal concepts of confidentiality, authentication and integrity.
However, new formal definitions of properties are required
to reason about privacy and its different aspects and shades.
Some of the most recurring privacy- related properties can
be described in terms of location privacy, anonymity and
unlinkability.
Modelling and verifying these properties is a difficult task
since the sources of possible attacks are often hidden in
implementation details or even in the protocol logic rather
than in the cryptographic guarantees of the employed encryp-
tion algorithms. Moreover, the modelling of the privacy-
related properties often relies on non-standard definitions of
equivalence, and as a result, some of the properties are not
supported by the currently available automatic verification
tools. Hence, modelling and verifying these novel proper-
ties is one of the challenges requiring further development of
the currently available automatic tools and, of course, of the
theory supporting them.
1.1 Contributions
In this work, we present a thorough although not complete
(i.e. we look only at some of the 2G/3G protocols) analysis
of privacy in mobile telephony systems. We experimentally
analyse these systems and point out flaws in the deployed
policies. We formally analyse some of the protocols and
identify vulnerabilities leading to user’s privacy breaches
which we show are feasible to implement on real networks.
We also show that there are realistic solutions for ensur-
ing privacy of mobile telephony subscribers and propose
some privacy-friendly fixes of the flawed procedures. More-
over, we contribute to the formal analysis of privacy-related
properties. In particular, we show how some definitions of
unlinkability and anonymity as given in [12] can be adapted
to beused for the automatic verificationusing theProVerif
tool. We use this technique to formally analyse the fixes we
propose to patch the flawed 2G/3G procedures. In Sects. 3,
4, and 5, we will investigate the privacy provided by 2G and
3G system. In particular, in Sect. 3, we recall a well-known
privacy weakness of mobile telephony which makes it possi-
ble to break user anonymity, and we reveal possible privacy
leakages produced by signalling procedures of the 2G/3G
protocol stack. Further, we conduct experiments to test the
effectiveness of the changing pseudonympolicies adopted by
mobile telephony systems and present a replay attack affect-
ing the TMSI reallocation procedure. In Sect. 4, we show an
attack that affects only 3G systems and takes advantage of
the information leakage resulting from the error messages
produced by the execution of the AKA protocol. In Sect. 5,
we demonstrate that it is possible to mount the attacks on
real 3G networks. In Sect. 6, we provide privacy-enhancing
versions of the procedures analysed in Sects. 3 and 4. Finally,
in Sect. 7, we use formal verification to give guarantees on
the privacy properties (anonymity and unlinkability) of the
fixed procedures.
1.2 Privacy
As D’Introna points out in [13], privacy is a very impor-
tant characteristic for the definition of social relationships
and more crucially a fundamental property to enable auton-
omy and individuality. Knowing to be observed influences
a person’s behaviour; indeed, we adopt different kinds of
behaviours depending on who is the observer. We chose
to share different things with different people according to,
for example, whether the relationship is intimate, social or
work-related. Hence, privacy seems to be fundamental for
the definition of oneself.
Privacy is a relatively novel concept that appears for the
first time in a 1890 analysis in the Harvard Law Review in
relation to a case of privacy invasion by the press [14], and
there is no universally accepted definition of privacy. In the
context of mobile telephony systems, privacy is a major con-
cern [15–18] because, as previously mentioned, the quality,
quantity and accuracy of collected personal data are of great
magnitude. Furthermore, the user is often unaware of gener-
ating the data and has little or no control over its generation,
exchange, transfer and use.
As in the real world, in the electronic world as well, pri-
vacy is a difficult property to define and we rather speak
of privacy-related properties instead, which can be general
ones or application specific. Moreover, privacy is a complex
property to enforce andverify since it ismulti-level andmulti-
protocol, i.e. it crosses more than one layer, if not all layers
of the protocol stack, and typically has to be enforced by all
protocols in order to be satisfied [19]. While some aspects
of privacy are more suited to be enforced by policies as, for
example, the sale of private information to third parties, oth-
ers should be part of the verifiable properties embedded in
the design of a system. However, privacy seems to be often
in conflict with other system requirements as for example
accountability, or in contrast with the nature of the system
itself as in the case of location-based services. For these
reasons, user’s privacy is often overlooked or enforced by
complex mechanisms which are difficult to verify by hand.
The most obvious privacy-related property is data confi-
dentiality. However, it is generally not sufficient to ensure
confidentiality in order to achieve privacy. For example, a
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user identifier could not be public and his identity could be
disclosed by correlating his activity [20–22].Moreover, mul-
tiple accesses to a system fromdifferent locations by the same
identifier could directly or indirectly reveal a user’s position
or his movement patterns. Hence, anonymity and unlinkabil-
ity of a user’s activity and access to a system are important
aspects of a user’s privacy. Location privacy is one of the
privacy aspects which has been the subject of many stud-
ies [23–25]. Several techniques have been proposed to protect
a user’s location, for example obfuscation, pseudonymity and
mix zones [23]. Another interesting privacy-related property
which can be for example desirable for private information
stored on portable devices is forward privacy which requires
that the secrecy of certain information holds even after the
device has been corrupted. For example, it may require that
session keys are not retrievable even in the event that the
master keys were disclosed after the device was corrupted.
Formal definitions of anonymity and unlinkability are given
in [12], definitions of untraceability and forward privacy are
given in [26], and a definition of voter’s privacy is given
in [27]. These definitions are all equivalence-based and often
pose challenges for the currently available automatic verifi-
cation tools because of the definition of the property itself,
because of the structure of the protocol or because of the alge-
braic properties of the involved cryptographic primitives.
In this work, we are concerned about mobile telephony
systems’ privacy. We carry out both experimental and for-
mal analysis in order to test the level of privacy provided to
mobile telephony users over the radio link. In particular, we
experimentally analyse the use of pseudonyms and expose
some critical scenarios which makes it possible to violate a
user’s privacy. Moreover, we expose some protocol’s flaws
resulting in breaches of the anonymity and/or user unlink-
ability (as defined in [12]). We show that it is possible to
implement the attack we found on a real network using an
hacked femtocell. We propose some lightweight fixes of the
flawed 2G/3G procedures. Finally, we provide the theoretical
framework for the automatic verification of the unlinkability
and anonymity of the fixed 2G/3G procedures.
1.3 Security protocols and formal methods
Security protocols aim to protect sensitive data in particu-
lar when communicating over an unprotected connection,
where there is little or no control over the flow of infor-
mation, and the attacker can intercept, manipulate, replay,
inject, replace, substitute and compare messages. This model
is sometimes called the Dolev-Yao attacker model [28]. This
makes the design of security protocols a notoriously diffi-
cult task since it does not only involve the protection of data
through some sort of smart cryptographic algorithm but also
the ability of foreseeing how the flow of messages could be
used to retrieve, deduce and get access to sensitive infor-
mation. Details hidden in the protocol logic often allow to
break a protocol security without even breaking the under-
lying cryptography. Examples are the attacks recently found
on TLS [29], SAML [6,30] and OAuth [5]. These attacks
do not take advantage of weak cryptography but rely on
the logic and interaction between concurrent protocols at the
same and/or different layers of the stack. Another example is
the traceability attack on the French e-passport which allows
one to trace an e-passport holder by performing a replay
attack [8]. Hence, to declare a protocol secure, one should
check it against anypossible adversary and anypossible inter-
action. Moreover, one would need to state what being secure
means for the protocol, i.e. should specify the security prop-
erties the protocol aims to achieve, and this would depend on
the purpose of the protocol and on the application require-
ments. Hence, to evaluate the security of a protocol, it is very
important to rigorously define both the protocol itself and the
desired security properties.
Formalmethods help establishing the security of protocols
in three ways:
– Rigorously modelling security protocols and the attacker
model
– Rigorously defining security properties
– Evaluating the protocols against the desired properties
There are two different formal approaches to the problem
of protocol security. The computational approach is closer to
the actual protocol implementation, represents messages as
bitstrings, cryptographic functions as polynomial time algo-
rithms and the adversary as any probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm and can give strong guarantees on the security of
the cryptographic algorithms. However, proofs in this setting
can be very long, difficult, error prone and not very accessible
to careful scrutiny. Moreover, they are not very well suited
for automation.
We will use symbolic methods instead. Symbolic meth-
ods abstract from the details of the cryptographic algorithms.
Messages are represented by terms and cryptographic prim-
itives are represented by function symbols which can be
applied to terms. The properties of cryptographic primitives
are abstracted by algebraic properties. In general, crypto-
graphic primitives are assumed to be perfect. Hence, the
adversary can have any interaction with the protocol, inject-
ing, modifying, replaying and intercepting messages but
cannot break cryptography.
As in the case of computational methods, in the symbolic
world the security of protocols can be established by means
of long, tedious and error-prone manual proofs or by man-
ually exhibiting a counterexample, i.e. an attack. However,
lots of work focus on automating the proofs and/or search
for counterexamples. In this area, there are still plenty of
challenges and room for improvements and researchers who
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continuously aim to expand automatic verification to larger
classes of protocols and equational theories for both reacha-
bility and equivalence-based properties.
Some of the most famous formalisms in the field of sym-
bolic methods are process calculi, constraint systems and
strand spaces. In this work, we will use the applied pi-
calculus [31] which is a calculus formodelling cryptographic
protocols offering flexibility in the range of cryptographic
primitives represented by function symbols and equational
theories andmaking the adversary knowledge explicit thanks
to the frame construct. Many results obtained using different
formalisms such as spi-calculus and constraint systems can
be transposed into the applied pi-calculus. We describe some
of the most relevant.
The general problem of security is shown to be unde-
cidable even for a bounded number of sessions for both
reachability-based properties [32] and for equivalence-based
properties [33]. Restricting the calculus and or to the equa-
tional theory can yield decidability results.
One of the most common restrictions is to consider only
a finite number of sessions. Automatic verifiers for bounded
processes can be very useful to find protocol flaws; how-
ever, when they do not find any attack, no guarantees of the
absence of attack can be derived for a number of sessions
greater than the one used to run the verifier on the protocol.
To obtain general security results, an unbounded number of
sessions should be considered. Another common restriction
to the calculus consists in forbidding else branching, and the
equational theory is often required to be convergent.
A decision algorithm for trace equivalence of bounded
processes with no else branching and a pre-defined signature
consisting of pairing, symmetric and asymmetric encryption
is given in [34] along with a prototype implementation for
checking deducibility and static equivalence. However, for
deciding, trace equivalence is required to implement a further
procedure that generates a pair of constraints for each possi-
ble interleaving. The AKiss tool implements two procedures
for bounded processes with no else branches and for con-
vergent rewrite systems with the finite variant property. One
procedure under-approximates trace equivalence and can be
used to prove protocols correct. The other over-approximates
trace equivalence and can be used to discard incorrect proto-
cols. The tool can be used to check observational equivalence
of determinate processes since in this case observational
equivalence coincides with the under-approximation of trace
equivalence.
The decidability of observational equivalence of “simple”
processes with no replication and with no else branches for
subterm convergent equational theories is shown in [35].
The decision procedure relies on the decidability of the
equivalence of constraint systems given in [36]. This pro-
cedure has not been implemented so far. To the best of
our knowledge, the only tool able to automatically ver-
ify both reachability-based [37] and equivalence-based [38]
properties for unbounded processes with else branches and
convergent theories is the ProVerif tool [39]. Blanchet,
Abadi and Fournet [38] introduce the concept of bi-process,
which is a pair of processes that differ only in the choice
of some term. ProVerif can prove observational equiva-
lence of bi-processes. However, the procedure is sound but
not complete, meaning that the tool can prove that a property
holds on the given protocol model, but when it outputs an
attack trace, this could be a false attack. Moreover, the tool
might not terminate.
2 Background: mobile telephony systems
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) and Uni-
versal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) are the
most widely used mobile telephony standards with bil-
lions of users worldwide. GSM was developed by European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in order to
promote a common standard for the European cellular tele-
phony replacing the multitude of first-generation standards.
UMTS is specified and maintained by the Third Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP); it was introduced in 1999 to offer
a better support for mobile data applications by increasing
the data rate and lowering the costs of mobile data commu-
nications. Furthermore, UMTS offers an improved security
architecture with respect to previous mobile communication
systems such as GSM. Both GSM and UMTS have been
improved and extended several times. We will use the terms
2G and 3G to indicate the wider set of standards including
GSM and UMTS, respectively. Most of the protocols and
issues presented in the following sections are common to
both 2G and 3G systems, when this will not be the case, it
will be explicitly pointed out. In the rest of this paper, we will
adopt a unified terminology to address mobile telephony sys-
tems components. However, 2G and 3G standards may not
use the same terminology even when addressing components
having the same functions/purposes.
In the next section, we will introduce the 2G/3G net-
work architecture and we will describe in more details their
security features. We will then summarize some of the well-
known weaknesses of mobile telephony systems, along with
relevant work on 2G/3G security and privacy.
2.1 GSM/UMTS architecture
The 2G/3G network architecture, depicted in Fig. 1, inte-
grates both GSM and UMTS components. The user side
of the network consists of mobile stations (MS). This term
is used in mobile telephony systems to indicate both the
mobile equipments (ME), such as mobile phones, and the
so-called SIM or USIM card (Universal Subscriber Identity
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Fig. 1 2G/3G architecture
Module) in 2G/3G systems, respectively. The (U)SIM card
identifies the user as a legitimate subscriber within a mobile
telephony operator network. To access the services offered
by a mobile operator, a MS connects through radio com-
munication technology to the UTRAN (UMTS Terrestrial
Radio Access Network) or GERAN (GSM/EDGE1 Radio
Access Network) network that is a GSM access network.
A mobile station directly communicates with a BTS (base
transceiver station) or Node B which covers the area the
MS is located in. One or more Nodes B are connected to
a Radio Network Controller (RNC), and one or more BTS
are connected to a Base Station Controller (BSC) defin-
ing a cell. A group of cells forms a Location Area. RNCs
and BSCs manage the radio resources and inter-cell han-
dover. They are the interface between the mobile station and
the core network. The core network offers circuit-switch
and packet-switch services. The mobile switching centre
(MSC) and gateway mobile switching centre (GMSC) offer
inter- and intra-network circuit-switching domain services,
respectively, and interface the 2G/3G systems with the tradi-
tional fixed telephony network. The Serving GPRS2 Support
1 EDGE (Enhanced Data rates for Global Evolution) is a standard part
of the 2G set aiming to provide faster bit rates for data application.
2 GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) adds packet switch function-
alities to GSM.
Node (SGSN) and theGateway ServingGPRS Support Node
(GGSN) offer, respectively, inter- and intra-network packet-
switching domain services as well as connecting 2G/3G
networks with the Internet. Within the core network, the
Home Location Register (HLR) stores permanent sensitive
information of subscribers such as identities, service pro-
files and activity statuses. These informations are linked to
the SIM and recorded when stipulating a contract with the
mobile network operator (MNO). 2G/3G systems offer roam-
ing capabilities between different mobile network operators
and between the different technologies (provided that the
mobile equipment supports them), meaning that a mobile
station can be connected to a visited network, the serving net-
work (SN), which might be different from the subscriber’s
home network (HN) and which could be using a different
standard. Each subscriber has a long-term identifier IMSI
(InternationalMobile Subscriber Identity) that is stored in the
(U)SIMand a temporary identifier TMSI (TemporaryMobile
Subscriber Identity), allocated by the serving network to pro-
tect the subscriber’s identity privacy. The Visitor Location
Register (VLR) stores temporary informations about sub-
scribers visiting a given location area of the serving network
and maintains TMSI/IMSI associations. The network oper-
ator and each subscriber share a different unique long-term
secret key used for authentication purposes. This key is stored
in the (U)SIM.The authentication centre (AuC) is a protected
123
M. Arapinis et al.
database storing associations between subscriber identities
(IMSI) and long-term keys.
In the rest of this work, we only consider a simplified
network architecture, since we are interested in third-party
attackers having access only to the radio path and not to
the wired network infrastructure. This architecture involves
simply the mobile stations and the network. The network
models both the UTRAN/GERAN Base Station that the MS
is directly communicating with and the complex structure
of databases and servers connected with it and forming the
UMTS/GSM control network. In particular, we do not distin-
guish between serving network and home network.Hencewe
abstract away from any communication within the network
and model only communication between mobile stations and
the network. This abstraction allows us to hide details which
are uninteresting for the purposes of our analysis and keep the
models used for verification small, but at the same time pre-
cisely model the interactions over-the-air between MS and
network, which are the subject of our analysis.
2.2 GSM/UMTS security features
The intended security features of 2G and 3G systems are
slightly different, as 3G systems aim to overcome the
weaknesses of 2G systems such as the lack of mutual authen-
tication and the use of weak ciphering algorithms.
2G systems aim to provide the following security fea-
tures [40]:
– Subscriber identity confidentiality The IMSI is not
made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals,
entities or processes.
– Subscriber identity authentication The corroboration
by themobile network communicating with a mobile sta-
tion that the subscriber identity (IMSI or TMSI), sent by
the mobile subscriber to identify itself, is indeed the one
claimed.
– User data confidentiality The user information exchan-
ged on traffic channels is not made available or disclosed
to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.
The 3G communication system aims to improve the
security features offered to mobile telephony subscribers,
requiring for examplemutual authentication between the user
and the network and specifying more precisely the provided
user’s privacy properties in terms of identity confidentiality
or anonymity, location confidentiality and user untraceabil-
ity or unlinkability. The security properties stated by the 3G
standard are as follows [41]:
– User identity confidentiality
– User identity confidentiality The permanent user
identity (IMSI) of a user to whom a service is deliv-
ered cannot be eavesdropped on the radio access
link;
– User location confidentiality The presence or the
arrival of a user in a certain area cannot be determined
by eavesdropping on the radio access link;
– User untraceability An intruder cannot deduce
whether different services are delivered to the same
user by eavesdropping on the radio access link.
– Entity authentication
– User authentication The serving network corrobo-
rates the user identity of the user;
– Network authentication The user corroborates that
he is connected to a serving network that is autho-
rized by the user’s HN to provide him services;
this includes the guarantee that this authorization is
recent.
– Confidentiality
– Cipher algorithm agreement TheMS and the SN can
securely negotiate the algorithm that they shall use
subsequently;
– Cipher key agreement The MS and the SN agree on
a cipher key that they may use subsequently;
– Confidentiality of user/signalling data User/
signalling data cannot be overheard on the radio
access interface;
Both 2G and 3G systems rely on an authentication and
key agreement (AKA) protocol, on the use of encryption of
the confidential data transmitted on the radio channel and on
the use of periodically changing temporary identities in order
to achieve the above- mentioned security properties. More-
over, 3G systems use integrity protection of the sensitive data.
Unlike the 2G authentication protocol, the 3GAKA protocol
allows MS and SN to establish not only a ciphering key but
also an integrity key and achieves mutual authentication of
MS and HN.
2.3 Previous work on 2G/3G security and privacy
Most of the work on security of mobile telephony systems
concern properties such as secrecy, integrity and authentica-
tion [42–44]. There are only few formal and experimental
studies concerning the level of privacy provided to users by
mobile telephony systems [45–47].
2G vulnerabilities The identification procedure, consisting
in the request of the user identity by the network followed by
a cleartext reply containing the user identity, is acknowledged
in the standard as a breach of the user identity confidential-
ity [41, p. 19, s. 6.2]. This procedure is exploited by the
well-known “IMSI catcher” attack, which is the best known
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attack to mobile telephony users’ privacy. It consists in forc-
ing a mobile phone to reveal its identity (IMSI) [48,49] by
triggering the identification procedure from a fake opera-
tor base station (configured with the corresponding mobile
network and country code settings). Moreover, the 2G fake
base station can then force the attached mobile station to use
no encryption for data and signalling communication, and
hence, it can capture ingoing and outgoing plaintext traffic.
Until fairly recently, implementing an IMSI catcher required
specialized software and equipment such as base stations.
However, such devices have become more and more afford-
able thanks to software emulation [50].
FooKune et al. [51] present a studyon the use of the paging
procedure to locate mobile telephony users. They perform a
tracking attack relying on passive sniffing of paging response
messages triggered by placing silent phone calls (obtained
by hanging up before the receiving phone rings) to the vic-
tim phone. This technique allows to reveal the presence of
the victim in an area monitored by the attacker. Munaut and
Nohl [43] previously outlined a similar technique. They per-
formed a GSM sniffing attack, which allows to eavesdrop a
GSM phone call by using a modification of the osmocom-
BB [52] open-source implementation of the GSM protocol
stack and an old Motorola mobile phone. Differently from
Foo Kune et al., they used a silent SMS to trigger the paging
responses needed to locate the victim. Although these works
take advantage of the fact that a TMSI is allocated for a long
time window, they do not analyse the security and privacy
provided by the TMSI reallocation procedure. Moreover, in
order to perform the attack, the adversary needs to know the
mobile number of the victim.
Engel showed at the 25C3 conference [53] how network
signalling messages, triggered when sending/receiving SMS
messages, can be used to localize mobile telephony users. He
suggests that network operators should use home routing, i.e.
forwarding through the home network, as a countermeasure
to this SMS tracking attack. This attack requires access to the
intra-network communication infrastructure, which although
possible may require subscription to a pay per query service.
In Sects. 3 and 4, we will analyse the privacy of the more
exposed over-the-air communication which is available to
any attacker with a radio-enabled device.Wewill not assume
to have control over the less easily accessible intra-network
communication channel.
The gsmmap project [45,46] assesses and visually ren-
ders on a map the level of security and privacy provided
by 2G and 3G network operators across the world. The
data about the security of 2G systems are gathered using
a variant of the open-source GSM protocol stack developed
within the osmocom-BB project, while data about the secu-
rity of 3G networks can be collected using some specific
model of mobile phones and downloading the gsmmap spe-
cific app. The project relies on volunteers to contribute the
needed data; hence, the map is not complete and some of the
results are estimations based on the available data. In partic-
ular, gsmmap aims to check whether network operators are
protecting the users from well-known attacks by adopting
countermeasures such as the use of A5/3 encryption, padding
randomization and full authentication for outgoing calls and
SMS to prevent impersonation and interception, and the use
of regular TMSI updates and home routing to prevent Engel’s
SMS tracking attack. However, the list of security protection
mechanisms gsmmap is looking for in order to evaluate the
security offered bymobile telephony systems is continuously
updated according to the most recent weaknesses found and
the suggested countermeasures.
Golde, Redon and Seifert [54] showed that it is possible to
hijack a mobile terminating service such as the reception of a
phone call or an SMSmessage and even perform a targeted or
large- scale denial of service by answering paging requests
faster than the intended recipient. They implemented their
attacks on GSM networks, but speculate they would work on
UMTS and LTE as well since the attacked procedure, i.e. the
paging procedure is common to the three systems.
3Gweaknesses resulting from3G/2G-interoperability 3G
mobile stations are as well vulnerable to 2G IMSI catcher; in
fact 3G systems are fully interoperable with 2G systems, and
3G mobile stations can roam in 2G networks. A 3G mobile
stations canbe induced to attach to a2Gbase stationbybroad-
casting a stronger signal with respect to the 3G one. To avoid
this, 3Gmobile stations can be configured to use only 3G net-
works. To the best of our knowledge, the only implementation
of a pure 3G IMSI catcher is the one presented in [55] and
is realized using a modified femtocell. Previously proposed
attacks on 3G security exploit the vulnerabilities which are
propagated from GSM to 3G when providing interoperabil-
ity between the two systems. Most of the reported attacks
of this kind take advantage of well-known weaknesses of
the GSM authentication and key agreement protocol, such
as the lack of mutual authentication and the use of weak
encryption. These attacks allow an active attacker to violate
the user identity confidentiality, to eavesdrop on outbound
communications [56] and to masquerade as a legitimate sub-
scriber obtaining services whichwill be billed on the victim’s
account [44]. However, these attacks cannot be carried out
on pure 3G networks, because they rely on the lack of mutual
authentication inGSMand on the possibility of downgrading
the communication from 3G to GSM.
3G specificTo the best of our knowledge, the only attack that
does not rely onGSM/3G interoperability has been presented
by Zhang and Fang in [57]. This attack is a variant of the
false base station attack and takes advantage of the fact that
the mobile station does not authenticate the serving network.
It allows the redirection of the victim’s outgoing traffic to
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a different network, for example, a network which uses a
weaker encryption algorithm or one which charges higher
rates than the victim’s one. Zhang and Fang’s attack concerns
impersonation, service theft and data confidentiality.
LTE privacy The LTE authentication and key agreement
protocol suffers from a linkability attack [58] similar to the
one we present in Sect. 4.2.
Previous formal analysis of 3G protocols The 3G AKA
protocol in its pure form (i.e. with no GSM support) has
been formally proved to meet some of the specified security
requirements [59], such as authentication and confidentiality
of data and voice communication. However, privacy- related
properties such as unlinkability and anonymity, which are
the focus of our work, are not analysed in [59]. The frame-
work applied in [59] cannot be used to specify unlinkability
and anonymity properties, let alone reason about them. The
formal framework we used allows us to precisely define and
verify privacy-related properties. Hence, we can discover pri-
vacy attacks on themodelled protocols and propose solutions
which we then formally prove to satisfy the desired privacy
properties.
Otherworkon3Gprivacy enhancementAnew framework
for authentication has been proposed to provide subscriber
privacy with respect to the network [47]. In particular, the
authors aim to achieve MSs anonymity with respect to the
serving network and location privacy of mobile stations with
respect to the home network. To achieve this purposes, they
propose a newmechanism for the location update and a three-
way handshake protocol to be used instead of the currently
used 3G AKA protocol. However, this work is not supported
by a formal model of the AKA protocol, nor does it pro-
vide a formal verification of the properties enforced by the
proposed protocols. Moreover, their attacker model consid-
ers the network as not fully trusted, while in this work we
are only concerned with third-party attackers controlling the
radio link communications.
The feasibility of implementing the solutions we propose
to fix the identification procedure, IMSI paging procedure
and AKA protocol in the current 2G/3G infrastructure is dis-
cussed in [60].
3 Analysis of mobile systems’ privacy: 2G/3G
weaknesses
In this section, we describe some of the mobile systems pro-
tocols that are dealingwith the identity ofmobile phone users
and point out breaches of the user’s privacy, which expose
a subscriber’s identity and allow an attacker to identify the
presence of a target mobile phone (MS) in a monitored area
or even track its movements across a set of monitored areas.
In Sect. 4, we illustrate a privacy breach that exploits a pro-
cedure specific of the 3G system. The attacker considered
in this section is capable of sending, receiving and sniffing3
messages over-the-air. Further, we assume that the attacker
has unlimited access to the radio link between themobile sta-
tion and the base station but no access to the communication
within the core network or between the base station and the
core network. As we will see, the attacker does not need to
know any keys, nor perform any cryptographic operation. In
fact, the vulnerabilities exposed in this section take advan-
tage of the poor management of the user identities, due to the
fact that at the timemobile telephony systemswere designed,
active attacks were considered too costly and hence unlikely
to be performed. In fact, mounting an attack required very
expensive equipment such as a base station. However as we
briefly discussed in Sect. 2.3, nowadays the development of
open- source devices and software has lowered significantly
these costs.
In the rest of this section, we present two procedures of
the mobile telephony protocol stack that involve the mobile
station identity, namely the identification procedure and the
paging procedure, and we show how these procedures can be
used to violate a user’s privacy. Furthermore, we introduce
the TMSI reallocation procedure that is the procedure imple-
menting the pseudonym changing mechanism adopted by
mobile telephony systems in order to provide anonymity and
unlinkability. We experimentally evaluate the effectiveness
of the pseudonym changingmechanism on real networks.We
finally show a replay attack on the TMSI reallocation proce-
dure which is enabled by the fact that the reuse of previously
established keys is allowed by the standard and is indeed a
policy adopted by real network operators (see Sect. 3.8).
3.1 Identification procedure
The identification procedure [61] allows the network to
request the credentials of a mobile station. In particular, the
network can request amobile station’s IMSI that identifies the
user’s SIMcard or better identifies the user as a legitimate one
having a contract with the MNO, or a mobile station’s IMEI,
which identifies the specific handset. The identification pro-
cedure is always initiated by the network. It is typically used
when amobile station connects to a network for the first time.
Once the network identifies the MS, it can initiate a proce-
dure to establish a shared short-term encryption key and then
usually assigns a temporary identity, TMSI, to the MS. The
temporary identity is transmitted to the MS in an encrypted
fashion and is used instead of the IMSI in the following com-
munications.
3 With sniffing we here mean the ability of listening to the communi-
cation happening on a dedicated channel established between a target
mobile station and the base station it is attached to.
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Fig. 2 Identification procedure. The identity of the mobile phone is
sent in clear on the radio path
The identification procedure consists of two messages:
the identity request message and the identity response mes-
sage. The parameter IMSI_Req specifies that the identity
requested by the network is the IMSI. The identity response
message is sent in clear alongwith the requested identity (see
Fig. 2).
3.2 Identification procedure attack
The identification procedure is acknowledged in the stan-
dard as breaching the user identity confidentiality. It allows
a passive attacker to overhear an MS’s IMSI. Moreover, any
attacker controlling a tool able to act as a base station can
trigger at any moment the identification procedure and cap-
ture the identity response and thus can trace the presence of a
particular subscriber in the range of his device. Moreover, he
can track themovements of the subscriber by installing track-
ing devices in different areas. This attack to the subscribers’
privacy is known as IMSI catcher attack [48,49,62]. Typi-
cally, the attacker would control a fake BS that just sends an
identity request and waits for the response.
3.3 Paging procedure
The paging procedure defined in [63] is used to locate a
mobile station in order to deliver a Mobile Terminated (MT)
service to it, for example an incoming call or SMS message.
The network sends paging requests in all the most recently
visited location areas in order to locate the mobile station. In
fact, most MS are idle most of the time to save battery so the
network does not know which base station is currently pro-
viding the best reception level to the MS. The paging request
message is sent on a Common Control Channel (CCCH) and
contains the identity of one ormoremobile stations. The pag-
ing procedure is typically run after a TMSI is assigned to the
mobile station by the network, and hence, the TMSI should
be used to identify a MS in the paging request. However,
the IMSI can be used when the TMSI is not known by the
network.
A mobile station receiving a paging request message
checks whether one of the identities included in the mes-
Fig. 3 IMSI paging procedure in GSM: the paging request message
is sent on a common radio channel and contains the long-term identity
of the paged mobile station IMSI in cleartext. The paging response
message also contains the IMSI and is sent in clear on a dedicated
channel
Fig. 4 IMSI paging procedure in UMTS: the paging request message
is sent on a common radio channel and contains the identity of the paged
mobile station (in this case the IMSI) in cleartext. The paging response
message contains the mobile phone’s temporary identity TMSI and is
sent in clear on a dedicated channel
sage is its own. If the check succeeds, the MS establishes a
dedicated channel to allow the delivery of the service. On this
dedicated channel, the MS sends a paging response message
containing its IMSI in GSM networks (see Fig. 3), the most
recently assigned TMSI in UMTS networks (see Fig. 4).
3.4 IMSI paging attack
The possibility of triggering a paging request for a specific
IMSI allows an attacker to check a specific area for the
presence of mobile stations whose identity is known to the
attacker and in 3G networks to correlate IMSI and TMSI.
The observation of the related paging response allows the
correlation of the victim’s IMSI with his current TMSI. In
practice, an attacker would need to confirm the link between
the paged IMSI and the related TMSI by replaying the attack
several times.
3.5 TMSI reallocation procedure
A mobile station (MS) is uniquely identified by means of
its IMSI. If a third party that eavesdrops on the radio link
was able to identify wireless messages as coming from a
particular mobile phone, he would be able to track the loca-
tion of the mobile phone user in real time. This could lead
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Fig. 5 TMSI reallocation procedure: the new TMSI along with the current Location Area Identifier (LAI) is sent in an encrypted message to the
mobile station in order to avoid users’ linkability
to stalking and other forms of harassment, as well as more
mundane invasions of privacy. To avoid over-the-air attackers
from identifying and linking a user’s transactions, a tempo-
rary identity called TMSI is assigned by the network and is
used to identify the mobile station in protocol messages sent
in clear over-the-air. The mobile station identity (its TMSI, if
available, or its IMSI) is always included in the first message
sent from the MS to the network after the establishment of a
dedicated channel. This allows the network to identify theMS
before delivering a service to it. For example, the identity is
carried in location update requests, CM (Call Management)
requests and paging responses. The use of TMSIs avoids
the exposure of the long-term unique identity (IMSI) and
hence aims to provide third-party anonymity and unlinkabil-
ity to mobile telephony subscribers. Temporary identities are
periodically updated by the network by means of the TMSI
reallocation procedure.
The 3GPP standard specifies that a new TMSI should be
assigned at least at each change of location area. Besides
this constraint, the choice of how often a new assignment
is performed within a location area is left to the network
operators [61]. In order to prevent an adversary linking the
old TMSI with the new one, the assignment of a new TMSI is
performed in cipheredmode. The session key used to encrypt
the new TMSI is established by executing the AKA protocol.
The TMSI reallocation assigns a new pseudonym (TMSI)
to a mobile station. The new TMSI is sent to the mobile
station in an encrypted fashion. Figure 5 depicts the TMSI
reallocation procedure as defined in the 3GPP standard [41,
61]:
– The mobile station sends a first message on a dedicated
channel. This message contains the current MS’s tempo-
rary identity oT MSI ;
– Upon receipt of thismessage, the network can identify the
MS and establish means for ciphering of the subsequent
communication on the dedicated channel;
– The rest of the communication is then encrypted and
consists of a TMSI reallocation command message con-
taining a new pseudonym nT MSI randomly chosen by
the network and the current location area nL AI (the area
within which nT MSI is meaningful);
– This message is followed by a TMSI reallocation com-
plete message which is sent by the MS to acknowledge
the completion of the reallocation procedure.
If the network does not receive the expected acknowledge-
ment from the MS, it maintains both oT MSI and nT MSI
as valid pseudonyms for the IMSI. The network can perform
a TMSI reallocation at any time, while a dedicated chan-
nel is established. The standard does not fully specify how
often this procedure should be performed. However, it man-
dates that it should at least be performed at each change
of location [61]. The standard defines two options for the
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management of the means for ciphering (i.e. to establish the
ciphering key CK):
(1) Either a fresh ciphering key is established by executing
the authentication procedure;
(2) Or a previously established ciphering key can be restored
by means of the security mode setup procedure, which
allows the MS and the network to agree on a ciphering
algorithm.
3.6 Subscriber privacy experimental analysis
In this subsection, we will present the results of our experi-
mental analysis of the use of TMSIs in mobile networks and
highlight critical scenarios from a privacy point of view. Our
aim is to analyse whether the changing pseudonyms policy
adoptedbymobile telephony systemsguarantees user privacy
as intended. In particular, two aspects appear to be important:
1. TMSI reallocationwill protect user privacy only if TMSIs
are re-allocated often enough and at the right times (e.g.
when usersmove between locations). The 3GPP standard
does not rigorously define the conditions under which
TMSI reallocation takes place, leaving the choice to the
network operators. As our experiments show, this leaves
users open to privacy abuses.
2. The success of TMSI reallocation requires that a wireless
eavesdropper cannot link the new TMSI to the old one.
Encrypting the TMSI in the allocation message is nec-
essary (but may not be sufficient) to ensure that. It turns
out that other factors, in particular the use of fresh ses-
sion keys for each TMSI reallocation, are also necessary
to guarantee unlinkability of old and new TMSIs. The
3GPP standard does not mandate this, again leaving user
privacy subject to choices made by network operators.
We monitored over-the-air communications of idle and
active MSs in order to understand how real networks imple-
ment user identity confidentiality through the use of TMSIs,
both in terms of frequency of reallocation and ciphering keys
used. Our experiments confirm that the reuse of previously
established keys is a commonly adopted policy. However,
we show that in case the reuse of encryption keys is adopted
for the execution of the TMSI reallocation procedure, this
enables a linkability attack which makes it possible to link
old and new TMSIs.
Our experiments were carried out using an old GSM
Motorola C115 mobile phone in France, UK, Greece and
Italy and using SIM cards from all the major UK, Greek and
Italian network operators.4
4 More specifically, we usedO2, T-Mobile, Vodafone andOrange in the
UK; Vodafone and Wind in Greece; Bouygues and Orange in France;
and Wind, Vodafone and TIM in Italy.
Fig. 6 Experimental tools
3.7 Experimental settings and scenarios
The Motorola C115 has a TI Calypso baseband chipset
which is supported by the Osmocom-BB project [52]. The
Osmocom-BB project includes an open-source implemen-
tation of the GSM baseband and various other applications
aiming to implement a GSM mobile station. The radio com-
munication functions are implemented in the firmwarewhich
is flashed from a laptop into the mobile phone through the
Osmocon software, bymeans of a T191 unlock cable (Fig. 6).
The firmware implements layer 1 of the GSM protocol stack,
while layers 2 and 3 are implemented in specialized appli-
cations running on the laptop and communicating with the
mobile phone through the T191 cable (Fig. 7). In particular,
we used the “mobile” application which implements layer
2 and 3 of the GSM protocol stack to provide all the basic
functions of a mobile phone (network registration, location
update, making and receiving calls, and sending and receiv-
ing SMSs). The mobile phone activities are logged on a shell
terminal, and the radio communication is encapsulated in
UDP packets sent to a configurable IP address. This traf-
fic can be captured through the Wireshark network traffic
Fig. 7 Osmocom-BB architecture
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Fig. 8 Trace of a UK Vodafone SIM card obtaining a new TMSI (0xb42c2fdd) on 22/03/12. The same TMSI is still in use on 25/03/12 after 3
days from its allocation
analyser [64]. Interactions with themobile phone are enabled
by a telnet command interface. This allows one to manually
select a network, start phone calls, send SMSs and service
requests, etc.
We captured over-the-air messages using the “mobile”
application in different settings:
1. Mobile station in idle state and not moving;
2. Mobile station in idle state and moving across two urban
areas;
3. Mobile station involved in activities such as receiving
or starting phone calls, receiving or sending SMSs, and
requesting services as for example call diversions.
Since the 3GPP standard merely gives guidelines, real
networks differ in the implementation details of the TMSI
reallocation. To understand whether the different implemen-
tations achieve the privacy guarantees theywere intended for,
we analysed the traffic captured with the mobile application.
In particular, we are interested in finding out whether the
frequency of TMSI reallocation execution is high enough to
defeat passive and active tracking attacks, whether the pol-
icy of changing TMSI at least at each change of location is
actually implemented so to obtain at least location-dependent
privacy and whether the frequency of execution of the TMSI
reallocation procedure is related to the amount of activity of
the MS (i.e. to how often the TMSI is exposed to overhear-
ing).
3.8 Findings/results
The 3GPP standard relies on the use and frequent realloca-
tion of TMSIs in order to provide user’s untraceability. In
particular, it mandates that the TMSI reallocation should be
performedwhenever theMSmoves between “location areas”
(identified by location area identifiers, LAIs). However, it is
known that location areas often span over several square kilo-
metres, and a subscriber’s movements are typically confined
within one or two location areas [65,66]. So location areas
may be too large to trigger TMSI reallocations in practice.
We report on three different scenarios showing that some
of the actual implementations of the strategy for changing
pseudonyms to avoid tracking are not offering enough pri-
vacy guarantees to the mobile telephony subscribers. Our
observation and their consequences on users’ privacy are dis-
cussed in this section.5
The TMSI reallocation procedure is rarely executed
Although in the standard the privacy offered to mobile phone
bearers is based on frequent updates of TMSIs, our experi-
ments show that the same TMSI can be allocated for several
hours and even days. Moreover, turning on and off the MS
does not usually result in a new TMSI being allocated. As an
example, Fig. 8 shows that a TMSI allocated on 22/03/2012
5 The traces that allowed us to draw the conclusions presented aremade
available for inspection [67].
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Fig. 9 Trace of a UKOrange SIM card. The TMSI used at location 234/33/1381 (packet no. 668) is accepted at location 234/33/29 (packet no.678),
while the 3GPP standard mandates a TMSI reallocation at each change of location
had not been updated by25/03/2012,making the phone track-
able for a period of 3 days. This behaviour can be observed
for the major UK, Greek, French and Italian network oper-
ators. An attacker could take advantage of the long life of a
TMSI andmonitor a few sub-areas using short-range devices
in order to obtain a fine-grained tracking of his victim within
a same LAI.
We observed that the major UK network operators and the
Vodafone and TIM Italian operators rarely execute the TMSI
reallocation even in presence of MS activity, but the first
message sent by a MS when requesting or receiving a ser-
vice contains its TMSI and hence exposes it to eavesdropping
third parties.Asmentioned in Sect. 2.3, TMSI livenessmakes
it possible to locate mobile telephony users without alerting
them. The attack consists in paging the victim and hence
provoking a paging response. To reduce the set of answer-
ing TMSIs to the victim’s one, the attacker must repeat the
process several times because more than one MS could be
sending a paging response at the same time and it is possible
only if the TMSI is not reallocated even in case of activity
exposing the TMSI (e.g. receiving calls). The attack in [51]
thus relies on the low frequency of TMSI reallocations and
demonstrates that changing pseudonyms, as mechanism to
provide location privacy, is not effective without a policy for
changing of pseudonyms which takes into account the actual
exposure of the pseudonym caused by the mobile station
activity.
A change of location area does not imply a change of
TMSI Although such a change is mandated by the 3GPP
standard. We observed this behaviour when capturing the
signalling messages of a mobile station moving by coach
between different cities in the UK, using the Orange and the
O2 networks where we observed the same pseudonym being
accepted in different location areas with no further execution
of the TMSI reallocation procedure. Assuming an average
speed of 70km/h, we observed that a newTMSIwas assigned
after about 45min (about 53km) and a second one after about
60min (about 70km), while we observed a change of LAI
every 5min on average, and hence, a new TMSI should have
been allocated, on average, about every 3km. Figure 9 shows
an example tracewhere a TMSI used at location 234/33/1381
(packet no. 668) is accepted at a different location 234/33/29
(packet no. 678).
The fact that a TMSI was accepted in two neighbouring
LAIs contradicts the specification that a TMSI reallocation
should be performed at least at each change of location.
However, changing pseudonymwhen changing location area
would provide location-dependent privacy to the user since
it would prevent passive tracking across different LAIs. The
combination of the two behaviours reported so far (i.e. keep-
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Fig. 10 Trace of a UK Lebara SIM card attached to the Vodafone net-
work while travelling on a train. The TMSI reallocation procedure is
executed by reusing a previously established key. TheMS first performs
a location update (packet no. 4063), then the authentication proce-
dure to establish a ciphering key (packets 4065, 4068), followed by
the TMSI reallocation procedure (packets 4079, 4081). The following
three TMSI reallocations (packets 9691, 9693, 71,695, 71,697, 92,653,
92,655) are executed without first performing the authentication proce-
dure and hence reusing the previously established ciphering key
ing the sameTMSI for a long period of time and not changing
it when changing location area) enables the attacker to both
track his victim within an area and follow him across differ-
ent areas without doing any extra effort other than passively
sniffing.
Previously established keys are restored and used to
encrypt the TMSI reallocation procedure Our captures
confirm that the reuse of previously established keys is a
policy adopted by real networks. In particular, we show that
this policy is adopted for the execution of the TMSI reallo-
cation procedure. The experiments we performed show that
major UK and Italian network operators6 reuse previously
established keys instead of performing the authentication
procedure before each execution of the TMSI reallocation
procedure. Figure 10 shows a trace from a UK Lebara SIM
card attached to the Vodafone network performing a loca-
tion update (packet no. 4063). Then the execution of the
authentication procedure establishes a new ciphering key
(packets 4065, 4068), and consecutively, the TMSI real-
location procedure (packets 4079, 4081) is executed. The
subsequent TMSI reallocations (packets 9691, 9693, 71695,
71697, 92653, 92655) are executed without previously per-
forming the authentication procedure and hence reusing the
previously established ciphering key.
6 UK: Vodafone and T-mobile; Italy: Vodafone.
The reuse of a previously established ciphering key
enables a replay attack. We describe the TMSI reallocation
replay attack in Sect. 3.9.
3.9 TMSI reallocation replay attack
So far in Sect. 3, we analysed the TMSI reallocation proce-
dure from an experimental point of view. In this section, we
demonstrate a replay attack on this procedure which allows
a third party to violate a user’s privacy in spite of the reallo-
cation protocol. This attack is enabled by the 3GPP standard
policy allowing to restore previously established keys. The
experiments reported in Sect. 3 confirm that this policy is
commonly adopted across real mobile telephony operators.
We now show that a linkability attack is enabled by the reuse
of session keys making it possible to link old and new TMSIs
on real networks. In particular, a replay attack such as the one
depicted in Fig. 11 could be mounted.
An attacker, controlling a radio device able to sniff and
inject messages over-the-air, first captures a TMSI realloca-
tion command (the second message in Fig. 11). Later on,
when the MS has possibly already changed its pseudonym
but not yet established new keys, the attacker can replay the
captured TMSI reallocation command (one message before
last in Fig. 11). Since reuse of the session keyCK is allowed,
the victim’s MS successfully decrypts the reallocation mes-
sage and sends the TMSI reallocation complete message.
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Fig. 11 TMSI reallocation procedure attack
This allows the attacker to distinguish the victim’s MS from
any other that would not successfully decrypt the message
and thus would not send any reply, even though in the mean-
time a different TMSI (nT MSIk in Fig. 11) was assigned to
the victim’s MS.
Note that although the TMSI reallocation suffers from
a replay attack, from a theoretical point of view, we have
not investigated the feasibility of the attack in practice. In
particular, it could be difficult to capture a legitimate TMSI
reallocation command message to be replayed during the
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attack, since this message is encrypted. Moreover, the actual
replay of the message is not trivial because the correct frame
number should be in use by the MS when decoding it, in
order to obtain the correct decryption. Further work would
be needed to assess the practicality of this attack on both 2G
and 3G networks.
3.10 Discussion
The experiments we conducted show how the adoption of
pseudonyms is not a sufficient condition to ensure the privacy
of mobile telephony users and that real network implemen-
tations leave plenty of room to tracking attacks. We suggest
network operators should adopt activity- related policies in
order to prevent active tracking attacks. In general, the exe-
cution of the TMSI reallocation procedure should be more
frequent even when theMS is in idle state, so to prevent mere
passive tracking. Moreover, we suggest that a MS should be
able to trigger the TMSI reallocation procedure in order to
tackle active attacks exposing the TMSI without involving
the network as for example directly injecting paging mes-
sages on the paging channel.
In particular, mobile network operators should enforce the
policy of changing pseudonyms at each change of location
area. This would reduce the probability of tracking across
different LAIs. Furthermore, considering that Foo Kune et
al. [51] are able to determine the presence of a target MS
in an area by triggering the paging procedure on average
8 times, we suggest that this threshold should be used as
maximum number of TMSI exposing messages a MS can
send in clear over-the-air before a reallocation procedure is
initiated by the network. This would lower the probability of
successful tracking attacks. Moreover, as a countermeasure
to simple passive tracking, a reallocation procedure should
periodically be triggered even in case the TMSI exposing
activity has been under the suggested threshold. This would
avoid the possibility of determining for example that a MS
has not moved in a given time frame. We suggest to keep the
time threshold fairly low. A sensible time threshold could be
devised by estimating the time window for 8 TMSI exposing
activity to occur when the MS is subject to average or low
usage load.
Using pseudonyms is a good mechanism to ensure the
user’s privacy, provided that there is enough possibility
of mixing within the network, which is usually the case
in mobile telecommunication networks. However, the effi-
ciency of the pseudonym change strategy depends on many
factors which the 3GPP standard leaves as implementation
choices.
We showed that the implementation choices made by real
network operators do not provide a satisfactory level of pri-
vacy and leave space for different kinds of tracking attacks.
Moreover, we showed that the loose standard specification
can produce implementations of the TMSI reallocation pro-
cedure which are subject to a linkability attack.
The TMSI reallocation procedure is adopted in 3G+ net-
works as well. However, our experiments were conducted on
the GSM network, and further work and specialized equip-
ment would be needed so to investigate the usage scenario of
TMSIs and TMSI reallocation in real 3G+ networks.
4 Analysis of mobile systems’ privacy: pure 3G
linkability attack
In the previous section, we showed how the paging procedure
can be exploited to perform a simple linkability attack and
we presented an experimental analysis of the identity man-
agement thanks to which we exposed the presence, in real
mobile networks, of critical behaviour from a privacy point
of view.Most of these privacy critical scenarios lead straight-
forwardly to breaches of themobile telephony users’ privacy.
In this section, we consider a “Dolev Yao” attacker [28] who
has full access only to the radio link,where he can sniff, inject,
replay and modify messages, but cannot break the cryptog-
raphy involved in the protocol, i.e. cannot encrypt/decrypt
without knowing the required encryption/decryption keys.
In this section, we show a replay attack that allows to track
the presence of a user in a monitored area or across a set of
monitored areas. This attack concerns the 3G authentication
and key agreement protocol.
4.1 3G authentication and key agreement protocol
The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol
achieves mutual authentication between a MS and the net-
work and establishes shared keys to be used to secure the
subsequent communications.
The keys are not exchanged during the protocol but com-
puted locally by the MS and the SN. According to [41], the
authentication procedure is always initiated by the SN for the
purpose of:
– Checking whether the identity provided by the MS is
acceptable or not.
– Providing parameters enabling theMS to calculate a new
UMTS ciphering key.
– Providing parameters enabling theMS to calculate a new
UMTS integrity key.
– Allowing the MS to authenticate the network.
EachMSwith identity IMSI shares with the network a differ-
ent secret long-term key, KIMSI , assigned to the subscriber by
the mobile operator and stored in the USIM. The secret key
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Fig. 12 3G authentication and key agreement
allows the MS and the network to compute shared cipher-
ing and integrity session keys to be used for encryption and
integrity check of communications.
A successful authentication procedure establishes a so-
called security context which identifies the set of keys
to be used for secrecy and integrity purposes; a Key Set
Identifier (KSI) is used to retrieve the established security
context through different sessions. Once a security context
is established, it is considered valid until the authentication
procedure is next executed or the deletion of KSI is requested
by the network.
The 3G AKA protocol [41], depicted in Fig. 12, con-
sists in the exchange of two messages: the authentication
request and the authentication response. Before sending an
authentication request to the MS, the network computes
the authentication data: a fresh random challenge RAND,
the authentication token AUTN , the expected authentica-
tion response f2KIMSI (RAND), the integrity key I K and the
encryption key CK (see Fig. 12). The functions f1, f2, f3, f4
and f5, used to compute the authentication parameters, are
keyed cryptographic functions computed using the shared
key KIMSI , see [68] formore details. The authentication func-
tion f1 is used to calculate the message authentication code
MAC; f2 is used to produce the authentication response para-
meter RES; the key generation functions, f3, f4 and f5, are
used to generate the ciphering key CK , the integrity key I K
and the anonymity key AK , respectively.
The network always initiates the protocol by sending the
authentication challenge RAND and the authentication token
AUTN to the mobile station. AUTN contains a MAC of
the concatenation of the random number with a sequence
number SQNN generated by the network using an individ-
ual counter for each subscriber. A new sequence number is
generated either by increment of the counter or through time-
based algorithms as defined in [41]. The sequence number
SQNN allows themobile station to verify the freshness of the
authentication request to defend against replay attacks (see
Fig. 12).
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The MS receives the authentication request, retrieves the
sequence number SQNN and then verifies the MAC (condi-
tion MAC = XMAC in Fig. 12). This step ensures that the
MAC was generated by the network using the shared key
KIMSI and thus that the authentication request was intended
for the mobile station with identity IMSI . The mobile station
stores the greatest sequence number used for authentication,
so far SQNMS . This value is used to check the freshness of
the authentication request (condition XSQN < SQNMS in
Fig. 12) to avoid replay attacks.
The mobile station computes the ciphering key CK , the
integrity key IK and the authentication response RES and
sends this response to the network. The network authenti-
cates the MS by verifying whether the received response is
equal to the expected one (RES = f2K (RAND)). The authen-
tication procedure can fail on the MS side either because the
MAC verification failed, or because the received sequence
number XSQN is not in the correct range with respect to the
sequence number SQNMS stored in the mobile station. In
the former case, the mobile station sends an authentication
failure message indicating MAC failure (Mac_Fail) as the
failure cause. In the latter case, the authentication failuremes-
sage indicates synchronization failure (Sync_Fail) as the
failure cause. When a MAC failure occurs, the network may
initiate the identification procedure. When a synchronization
failure occurs, the network performs re-synchronization.
After successful authentication, the SN sends a security
mode command message to the MS, indicating which one
of the allowed algorithms to use for ciphering and integrity
checking of the following communications.
4.2 3G AKA protocol linkability attack
To detect the presence of a victimmobile station MSv , in one
of his monitored areas, an active attacker just needs to have
previously intercepted one legitimate authentication request
message containing the pair (RAND, AUTN) sent by the net-
work to MSv . The captured authentication request can now
be replayed by the adversary each time he wants to check
the presence of MSv in a particular area. In fact, thanks to
the error messages, the adversary can distinguish any mobile
station from the one the authentication request was origi-
nally sent to. On reception of the replayed authentication
challenge and authentication token (RAND,AUTN), the vic-
tim mobile station MSv successfully verifies the MAC and
sends a synchronization failure message. However, theMAC
verification fails when executed by any other mobile station,
and as a result, a MAC failure message is sent. The imple-
mentation of few false BSs would then allow an attacker to
trace the movements of a victim mobile station, resulting
in a breach of the subscriber’s untraceability. The proposed
attack is shown inFig. 13.Note that this attack affects only 3G
mobile systems; in fact 2G systems adopt a different authenti-
cation protocolwhich does not providemutual authentication
(i.e. themobile station does not authenticate the network) and
does not involve error and recovery procedures in case the
Fig. 13 AKA protocol linkability attack
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authentication of the network fails. Thus, the distinguishing
attack on the error messages cannot be performed in 2G net-
works.
5 Implementation of some 3G protocols attacks
In order to test the attacks presented in Sects. 3.4 and 4.2 in
a deployed telecommunication network, we used a commer-
cially available femtocell. Although the particular femtocell
hardware is tied to the network operator SFR, the proposed
attacks are not. Indeed, we tested the attacks using mobile
phones registered to different operators, hence just using SFR
as serving network. The authentication token AUT N is still
provided by the victim’s Home network. So by testing our
attacks on T-Mobile, O2, SFR and Vodafone victim MSs,
we establish that all these tested networks are vulnerable to
the attacks described above. However, we want to stress here
that our implementation has the only purpose of showing the
feasibility of our attacks and confirm that real cellular net-
works follow the 3GPP standard specifications and thus are
vulnerable to the proposed attacks. The same attacks could be
mounted by appropriately programming a USRP [69], which
is a hardware device able to emit and receive radio signals.
In this case, one could obtain wider range attack devices in
order to monitor larger areas.
5.1 Femtocell architecture
A femtocell is a device that acts as a small base station
to enhance 3G coverage and connectivity, especially inside
buildings with otherwise bad coverage. Its coverage radius
ranges from 10 to 50m. It connects mobile phones to the net-
work of the corresponding MNO (mobile network operator)
using an existing wired Internet connection provided by the
femtocell user, not the operator. 3G femtocells, also called
Home Node B (HNB), support most of the functionalities
provided by a typical 3G base station (Node B), e.g. physical
layer (radio signalling) functions. In addition, theHNBestab-
lishes an authenticated secure tunnel over the Internet with
the network of the operator. Using this encrypted connection,
the femtocell forwards all radio signalling and user-generated
traffic to the GANC (GAN Controller), which is connected
to the core network of the operator (refer to [70] for more
details of the femtocell architecture).
The communication between the femtocell and theGANC
is based on the Generic Access Network (GAN) protocol.
The GAN protocol was originally designed to allow mobile
communication over Wi-Fi access points. The protocol was
standardized byMNOs in 2004 [71] and led to theGANspec-
ification [72,73] in 2005. This specification has been adopted
and extended to be used in femtocell environments [74]. The
femtocell uses this protocol to forward communication from
a mobile station via the GANC to the network or vice versa.
The MS does not need any special GAN support; it just con-
nects to the femtocell in the same way as it connects to a
standard base station. The femtocell maps all Layer-3 radio
signalling to TCP/IP-based GAN messages and passes them
to the GANC. Thus, it transparently encapsulates all traffic
generated by the phone and the network.
5.2 Attack procedure
For the purpose of implementing our attacks (Sects. 3 and
4.2), we use a compromised femtocell like the one described
in [55]. More specifically, we reproduce the hacking per-
formed in [55] to gain root access of our femtocell and
redirect the traffic to a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) GAN
proxy, positioned between the femtocell and the GANC. We
use this MitM GAN proxy as entry point for message injec-
tion. In particular, using the MitM GAN proxy, we can inject
messages into the connection between theMNOand the fem-
tocell. The femtocell forwards these messages to the mobile
phone, making them appear as legitimately delivered by the
MNO.Toperform the attacks,we intercept,modify and inject
3G Layer-3 messages into the communication from the base
station to the mobile phone in both directions, GANC-to-
femtocell and femtocell-to-GANC.We redirect all the traffic
between the femtocell and the GANC to our GAN proxy.
The GAN traffic is cleartext travelling over an IP Sec tun-
nel for which we own the key material, thanks to the initial
rooting/hacking of the femtocell. Additionally, we developed
a set of applications which allow us to intercept, manipulate
or insert selected messages and distinguish different types
of GAN messages. This allows us, for example, to cache
subscribers information used to perform the attacks. In partic-
ular,we store the randomchallengeRAND, the authentication
token AUTN , the TMSI and the IMSI of our victimMS. This
information is directly extracted from the traffic that is passed
through the MitM GAN proxy.
IMSI Paging Procedure Attack To perform the IMSI paging
attack, our software crafts a paging message encoding the
necessary paging headers and parameters and a mobile sta-
tion identity, i.e. one of the previously stored victim IMSIs.
The crafted paging request is then sent by the GAN proxy
to the femtocell. When the victim mobile phone receives
the IMSI paging request, it readily answers with a paging
response containing the victim’s TMSI. Thus, by injecting a
paging request, we can check whether a phone belonging to a
designated victim is in the area covered by our device. In case
of success, the phone generates the paging response, while a
failed attempt generates no message. In general, it is possible
that more than one phone replies to a paging request during
the same time slot. However, one can repeat this procedure
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Fig. 14 Experimental attack setup
multiple times and correlate the timing and TMSI usage from
the multiple replies as in [51].
AKA Protocol attack To perform the AKA attack, we replay
a given authentication message for a specific target for which
the GANproxy cached the legitimate authentication data, i.e.
RAND,AUTN . These data are sent unencrypted on the radio
link and could be captured with any equipment capable of
sniffing the radio link. As soon as a dedicated channel is
allocated to the MS, e.g. after being paged or when initiating
a phone call, our software crafts an authentication request
Auth_Req using the previously cached RAND and AUTN ,
i.e. replays a previous request. This request is encapsulated
into a GANmessage and sent to the femtocell. The femtocell
takes care of delivering the authentication request message
on the dedicated channel assigned to the MS, as illustrated in
Fig. 14. The phone performs a validation of the authentication
request and answers with the authentication response. If the
response to the replayed authentication is a Synchronization
Failure (Fig. 15), then theMS on this dedicated channel is the
victim’s phone, and the victim is indeed in the femtocell area.
Otherwise, if the response to the replayed authentication is a
MAC failure (Fig. 16), the attacker needs to inject the same
message to the other mobile stations in his area in order to
find out whether the victim MS is present or not.
The 3GAKAprotocol is performed at each new session in
the femtocell setting. This makes the caching of the authenti-
cation parameters very easy. Thoughwe do not have the tools
to testwhether this applieswhen connecting to a typicalNode
B, we tested the 3G/GSM interoperability scenario by using
the Osmocom-BB software and we observed that in this set-
ting the execution of the AKA protocol can be triggered by
calling for example the victim mobile phone a given num-
ber of times (by hanging up within a short time window, this
activity can be made non-detectable by the victim [51]). For
instance, our experiments showed that the execution of the
AKA protocol on the UKVodafone network can be triggered
by calling six times the victim mobile phone and hanging up
before it even rings.
To illustrate the use of our attacks, consider an employer
interested in tracking one of his employee’s accesses to a
building. He would first use the femtocell to sniff a valid
authentication request. This could happen in a different area
than the monitored one. Then the employer would position
the device near the entrance of the building. Movements
inside the building could be tracked as well by placing
additional devices to cover different areas of the building.
Similarly, these attacks could be used to collect large amount
of data on users’ movements in defined areas for profil-
ing purposes, as an example of how mobile systems have
already been exploited in this direction is available in [75]. If
devices with wider area coverage than a femtocell are used,
the adversary should use triangulation to obtain finer position
data.
6 Privacy-friendly fixes
Despite the fact that mobile telephony systems adopt tempo-
rary identities to avoid linkability and to ensure anonymity
of mobile telephony subscribers, active attackers can exploit
the identification and the paging procedure to break both
anonymity and unlinkability. Moreover, the TMSI realloca-
tion procedure and the AKA protocol provide a way to trace
mobile telephony users without the need to identify them
in any way. These attacks on user privacy are not only the-
oretical but can be implemented in practice, as described
in Sects. 3 and 5. Hence, the analysed procedures are a
real threat for users’ privacy, and countermeasures should
be taken to provide an effectively privacy-friendly mobile
telephony system. In this section, we propose some privacy-
friendly solutions tackling the issues exposed in Sects. 3,
and 4. In Sect. 7,we showhow tomodel and verify anonymity
and unlinkability of the proposed fixed procedures using an
automatic protocol verifier called ProVerif .
We propose a set of countermeasures involving sym-
metric and public key-based cryptography. The public key
infrastructure we propose is easy to deploy because we only
require one public/private key pair per mobile network oper-
ator and none for the mobile stations. More generally, the
solutions we present require only small changes to the cur-
rent security architecture and to the cryptographic functions
currently used in 3G. Hence, we believe our solutions may
be implemented in a cost-effective way and thus could real-
istically be adopted by the telecommunication operators in
future generation mobile telephony systems. However, our
solutions do not aim to be full protocol specifications. Their
role is to show that realistic privacy-friendly solutions are
possible without dramatic changes to the current infrastruc-
ture.
In this section, we propose solutions to fix the identifica-
tion procedure, the IMSI paging procedure, the TMSI reallo-
cation procedure and the AKA protocol. Indeed, the problem
of privacy is a multilayer/multiprotocol problem [19] which
requires all protocols at all layers to satisfy the desired prop-
erties.
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Fig. 15 Linkability attack: victim found
Fig. 16 Linkability attack: victim not found
6.1 Public key infrastructure
We propose the adoption of a public key infrastructure (PKI)
providing eachMNOwith a private/public key pair. The pub-
lic key of a user’s network provider can be stored in the
USIM. This public key makes it possible for a mobile station
to encrypt privacy-related information such as the IMSI and
deliver them to the network in a confidential manner. We do
not require a public/private key pair to be assigned to the
mobile stations. The adoption of such a PKI can also solve
the problem exposed by Zhang and Fang in [57] concerning
the lack of serving network authentication in the current 3G
infrastructure.
6.2 Fixes of the analysed procedures
Protecting the Identification Procedure The identification
procedure exposes the IMSI of a MS (the IMSI is sent in
cleartext upon request by the network). Hence, it breaches
both anonymity and unlinkability. According to the standard,
the use of the identification procedure should be limited as
much as possible, to avoid a passive attacker overhearing the
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Fig. 17 Identification procedure fix. The identity response is encrypted
with the public keyof the network.The r denotes randomized encryption
IMSI. However, as discussed in Sect. 2, the cost of devices
allowing active attacks is constantly decreasing. An active
attacker can simply trigger the identification procedure to
retrieve the identity of all users in a monitored area [50]. We
propose a solution to tackle this well-known attack (IMSI
catcher attack). The fixed version of the identification pro-
cedure (Fig. 17) involves two messages: the first is sent by
the network to ask for the IMSI, and the second, the iden-
tity response, is the randomized encryption of the IMSI of
the mobile station using the public counterpart (pbN) of the
private key of the network operator (pvN). The identification
procedure always happens on a dedicated channel and after
the MS sent a first Layer 3 message containing its temporary
identity TMSI. We require an MS attached to a network dif-
ferent from its HN to include the HN identity in the first L3
message sentwhen attaching to the SN. The SN can then send
its public key and certificate signed by the mobile station’s
HN along with the identity request message.
For example, an MS that has just been switched on would
attach, by asking for a dedicated channel, to the (allowed)
network offering the best signal and would then send an
(L3 message) IMSI attach message (which is actually a type
of location update message) containing its current TMSI.
In our solution, this message would carry the HN iden-
tity. Assuming that the SN does not recognize the TMSI,
then it would send an identity request message carrying its
public key pbSN and certificate signed by the MS’s home
network sign(pvHN , (pbSN, SNid)). The MS would then
reply sending the identity response message containing the
randomized encryption of the IMSI of the mobile station
using the public counterpart (pbSN) of the private key of
the network operator (pvSN). This solution is illustrated in
Fig. 18
Protecting the IMSI paging procedure To protect the paging
procedure, we propose to encrypt the paging request using
a shared session key UK , which we call unlinkability key.
This key is generated by applying a new one-way keyed func-
tion f to the long-term key KIMSI and a random number rand
contained in the paging request. This key should be used for
privacy-preserving purposes only. Furthermore, we require
the encrypted request message to include a random challenge
chall and a sequence number SQN . The network stores the
random challenge and checks it against the one sent by the
MS in the paging response (Fig. 19). The aim of the SQN
is to ensure freshness of the paging request and avoid replay
attacks. The SQN should be handled in the same way as in
the AKA protocol. A MS receiving a legitimate IMSI pag-
ing request should discard it if the SQN is not in the correct
range. The use of this procedure should still be kept mini-
mal (preferring the paging with TMSI whenever possible) to
avoid burdening the signalling communication with crypto-
graphic operations. In fact, eachMS has to decrypt and check
all the received encrypted IMSI paging to determine whether
it is the recipient (note that TMSI paging is still sent in clear-
Fig. 18 Identification procedure fix when roaming. The identity response is encrypted with the public key of the serving network. The r denotes
randomized encryption
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Fig. 19 Paging procedure fix. The paging request is encrypted with the unlinkability key UK
text). To enable the IMSI paging by a serving network, the
encrypted paging request may be precomputed by the home
network and IMSI paging vectors could be sent in bulk to the
serving network theMS is attached to.An IMSI pagingvector
(chall, rand, {Page, I MSI, chall, SQNN }UK ) would
contain the challenge, the random and the encrypted paging;
in this way, the unlinkability keyUK and the sequence num-
ber SQNN only have to be shared between the MS and the
home network.
As an alternative solution, one could slightly relax the
privacy requirements and allow a passive attacker to discover
that the victim recently visited a certain location area. In this
case, the IMSI paging request could be sent in clear over-the-
air as it already is in the current systems. However, the paging
response would be encrypted using the network’s public key.
This would eliminate the burden for the MS of decrypting all
the received IMSI paging requests.
Fixing the TMSI reallocation procedureThe solutionwe pro-
pose to fix the TMSI reallocation procedure does not require
any change in the security architecture of mobile telephony
systems. We only require the standard to specify that the
reuse of the encryption key, CK , is not permitted when the
key is used to execute the TMSI reallocation procedure, i.e.
the establishment of a new symmetric encryption key before
the execution of the TMSI reallocation procedure should be
mandatory. This would avoid the possibility of replay attacks
to bemounted. However, frequent executions of the authenti-
cation procedure could burden the radio communication and
slow down the delivery of mobile telephony services. Alter-
native solutions are possible, as for example the introduction
of a sequence number in the TMSI reallocation command,
similarly to the one used to avoid replay attacks against the
authentication and key agreement protocol [41].We illustrate
this solution in Fig. 20. The network sends a sequence num-
ber SQNSN alongwith theTMSI reallocation command. The
MS checks whether the received sequence number is in the
expected range (SQNMS ≤ SQNSN ). If so, it carries onwith
the reallocation of the TMSI. Otherwise, the MS aborts the
TMSI reallocation execution, hence avoiding replay attacks.
Fixing the AKA Protocol The AKA protocol is a threat for
the unlinkability of 3G subscribers because the error mes-
sages sent in case of authentication failure leak information
about the identity of the subscriber. To avoid this information
leakage, the error messages sent in case of any type of fail-
ure should look indistinguishable from an attacker’s point of
view.
Moreover, the 3G standard stipulates [41] different proce-
dures to recover from each of the two kinds of failure, but this
is a source of additional information flow that can be used
to launch our privacy attack. In the solution we propose, we
solve this problem since error recovery can be performed
within the network without the need to trigger further proce-
dures over-the-air. Indeed, all the parameters needed for error
recovery are sent in the error message allowing the recovery
procedure to be carried within the network.
The fixed version of the AKA protocol (Fig. 21) car-
ries on as specified by the standard. The network sends
RAND,AUTN and waits for a response. The response is
RES = f2KIMSI (RAND), as in the standard, in case the checks
of MAC and sequence number are successful. If either of
these checks fails, an error message is sent to the network.
The failure message is now encrypted with the public key
of the network pbN and contains a constant Fail, the IMSI
and the current sequence number SQNMS of the MS. The
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Fig. 20 TMSI reallocation procedure fix: this fix uses the SQN to ensure the freshness of the reallocation command
Fig. 21 The fixed AKA protocol. The error messages are encrypted using the network public key
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IMSI sent encrypted in the error message allows the net-
work to check the identity of the MS without triggering the
identification procedure. The current sequence number of
the mobile station enables the network to perform resyn-
chronizationwith theAuthentication Centre (AuC, the server
storing subscribers authentication data) of the operator of the
mobile station, if needed. SQNMS is sent encrypted with the
unlinkability key (as defined in the fixed paging procedure)
in order to authenticate the error message to the network
as coming from the MS with permanent identity IMSI . The
network can deduce the cause of the failure from the IMSI
and SQNMS contained in the error message. Upon receipt of
this authentication failure message, the action performed for
error recovery purposes should be the same regardless of the
type of failure occurred. Indeed any difference in behaviour
would be a source of additional information flows. Note that,
as suggested in [60], simpler solutions such as not sending
any error message or sending a constant error message are
also possible. However, these solutions do not allow the net-
work to perform neither resynchronization nor any other sort
of error recovery procedure since no information on the cause
of the failure is given to it.
6.3 Discussion of the proposed fixes
While the fix we propose for the TMSI reallocation pro-
cedure and for the identification procedure is intuitive and
straightforward, this is not the case for the other two pro-
cedures. In particular, we take care of maintaining the style
of mobile telecommunication protocols and at the same time
ensuring privacy. We introduce the unlinkability key, a new
session key generated for privacy purposes, instead of using
the long-term key KIMSI (as in the 3G AKA) and make use
of the sequence number SQN for freshness purposes (this is
needed to avoid user linkability caused by replay attacks).
We maintain the authentication flow of the AKA and mod-
ify only the way error messages are dealt with by including
error recovery information inside the error message (this
avoids the triggering by the network of specific procedures
in order to perform error recovery depending on the occurred
error).
Our proposed fixes use public key cryptography; intu-
itively, there is noway to avoid that, since if amobile station’s
TMSI is unknown to the serving network (hence the need to
perform the identification procedure), then there is no shared
key bywhich they can communicate privately. The additional
costs associated with deploying and using public key cryp-
tography are in fact small for the two following reasons.
Firstly, only mobile telephony operators are required to
have a public/private key pair. Neither subscribers normobile
phone equipments or USIMs need to have their own pub-
lic/private key pair. The operator’s public key could be stored
in the USIM of the mobile station, as it is already the case
for the IMSI and the long-term key KIMSI. The home net-
work can act as a certifying authority for the public key of
the different serving networks (see below). Thus, the public
key infrastructure is similar to that used on the web, where
corporations (not users) have certified keys.
Secondly, the computationally expensive public key
encryption anddecryption are requiredonly for the identifica-
tion protocol andwhen theAKAprotocol fails. The execution
of the identification and the IMSI paging procedures should
anyway be kept minimal according to the currently deployed
standard.Moreover, failures during the execution of theAKA
protocol rarely occur according to our experiments. Hence,
the computational overhead of the public key cryptography
is not significant. Moreover, it is possible to delegate the
encryption and decryption to the mobile equipment, instead
of executing them on the USIM. This would not weaken the
security properties of the 3G procedure, since the mobile
equipment in the current architecture has already access to
the IMSI, while the network public key is publicly available
information.
For roaming purposes, each home network (HN) can act
as certifying authority of the serving network (SN) for its
own subscribers. The public key pbHN of the HN could
be stored in the USIM. At registration time with a SN, the
MS would declare its HN, and the SN would provide the MS
with its public key pbSN , together with a certificate from
the mobile station’s HN (signskHN(pbSN)). Hence, a mobile
station would only need to obtain a certified version of the
SN’s public key and verify it using its own network provider
public key. This would provide, in a efficient way, the MS
with the necessary public keys to execute our fixed versions
of the protocols.
The introduction of cryptographic operations on the
mobile equipment side could be a source of denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks aiming to consume the battery load of vic-
tim MSs. To mitigate the effect of such attacks, the mobile
phone’s software could rate limit the phone’s willingness to
respond to authentication, IMSI paging and identity request
messages, so to guarantee a minimum battery life time even
in case of attempted DoS attacks. We have calculated that
responding to such requests on average once per minute
would consume an additional one-tenth of battery life.
7 Automatic verification of the fixed protocols
Manydeployed protocols have subsequently been found to be
flawed [6,76–78]. In this perspective and in order to increase
the confidence one can have in the solutions proposed in
Sect. 6, we show how to formally analyse our proposed
fixes w.r.t. privacy. We use the formalization of privacy-
related properties as given by Arapinis et al. in [12], namely
strong unlinkability and strong anonymity, and adapt them
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P, Q, R ::= plain processes
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
new n; P name restriction
if M = N then P else Q conditional
let M = D in P else Q destructor application
in(M, x); P message input
out(M, N); P message output
Fig. 22 ProVerif syntax
to obtain definitions suitable for automatic verification using
the ProVerif tool [79].
7.1 ProVerif Encoding
We use the automatic verification tool ProVerif [79]
which takes in input processes written in a syntax similar
to the applied pi-calculus [31] one. In the rest of this section,
we use the ProVerif syntax (see Fig. 22) to describe how
we modelled the fixed protocols. However, we omit the full
formal details for which we refer the reader to [37,80].
Cryptographic primitives are modelled as functions and
messages are represented by terms built over an infinite set
of names a, b, c, . . ., an infinite set of variables x, y, z, . . .
and a finite set of function symbols f1 . . . , fn . The effect of
applying function symbols to terms is described by a set of
reduction rules.
Example 1 Using functions and reduction rules, we can
define cryptographic functions.
fun senc/3, pub/1, aenc/3,
f/2, f1/2, f2/2, f3/2, f4/2, f5/2.
reduc sdec(k, senc(k, m, r))= m.
reduc adec(k, aenc(\texttt{pub}(k),m,r))= m.
The functions senc and aenc model randomized sym-
metric and asymmetric encryption, respectively. In particular,
the reduction rules allow to retrieve the plaintext m from its
encryption given the knowledge of the decryption key k.
The functions f/2, f1/2, f2/2, f3/2, f4/2,
f5/2 model the one- way functions used in mobile tele-
phony protocols.
We briefly describe the informal semantics of the calculus
(formal details can be found in [37,80]. The null process
does nothing. P | Q represents the parallel execution of P
and Q. The replication !P of a process P acts like the parallel
execution of an unbounded number of copies of P. The name
restriction new n;P creates a new name n whose scope is
restricted to the process P and then runs P. The message
input in(M,x);P represents a process ready to input from
the channel M. The message output out(M,N);P describes a
process that sends a termN on the channelM and then behaves
like P. The let construct tries to rewrite D and matches the
result with M; if this succeeds, then the variables in M are
instantiated accordingly and P is executed; otherwise, Q is
executed. The conditional checks the equality of two terms M
and N and then behaves as P or Q accordingly. We will omit
the else branch of a let or a conditional when the process Q
is 0.
Example 2 A system consisting of multiple mobile stations
MS, with identity imsi, and long-term private key sk run-
ning along with the serving network, SN, can be modelled
by the process:
S = new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c,pbN);
!new sk;new imsi; !new sqn; (SN|MS).
The privacy properties we verify are expressed in terms of
observational equivalence. Intuitively, two processes P and
Q are observationally equivalent denoted by P ≈ Q, if any
interaction of P with the adversary can be matched with an
interaction of Q (and vice versa, i.e. all interactions of Q can
be matched by P) and the same input/output behaviour is
observed.
The ProVerif tool can prove diff-equivalence of bi-
processes, which implies observational equivalence. Bi-
processes are pairs of processes which differ by some choice
of terms; this choice is written choice[M,M′]. For example,
to test whether the processes out(c,a) and out(c,b) are
equivalent, one would check the following biprocess using
ProVerif : out(c,choice[a,b]). Diff-equivalence is
stronger than observational equivalence; this means that
when ProVerif terminates producing an attack trace, the
attack could be a false attack. However, when ProVerif
terminates with a proof, this means that, under the abstrac-
tions/assumptions made when modelling the protocols, there
are no attacks to the verified property.
The encoding of the equivalence representing unlinkabil-
ity is challenging since the processes to be tested do not have
the same structure, and because of this, it is not straightfor-
ward to see how to build the biprocess representing them. In
the next two sections, we show how we built the biprocess
to test strong unlikability and the biprocess to test strong
anonymity, respectively.
7.2 Strong unlinkability
In our mobile phone scenario, the strong unlinkability prop-
erty holds when the situation where mobile stations access
services multiple times looks the same as the ideal situation
where eachmobile station accesses the services at most once,
i.e. where by construction unlinkability holds. Formally, we
want the process S, defined in Example 2, to be observation-
ally equivalent to the process SUNLINK defined as follows:
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SUNLINK = new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c,pbN);
!new sk;new imsi;new sqn; (SN|MS).
The absence of the replication before the new sqn construct
means that in SUNLINK each MS executes the protocol at
most once. The above-mentioned observational equivalence
can be verified with ProVerif , defining S and SUNLINK
as the following biprocess PVUNLINK, where sk1,sk2
are long- term keys and imsi1,imsi2 are long-term
identities:
PVUNLINK = new pvN;letpbN = pub(pvN)in
out(c,pbN);
!new sk1;new imsi1;
!new sk2;new imsi2;new sqn;
let(sk,imsi) = choice[(sk1,imsi1), (sk2,imsi2)]
in(SN|MS).
We have that the left side of the choice represents a sys-
tem where a mobile station (with identity imsi1 and key
sk1) may execute the protocol many times, while the right
side represents a system where mobile stations execute the
protocol at most once (the identity imsi2 and the key sk2
are always different and can be used at most once for the
execution of the protocol). Hence, we reduce the problem
of testing strong unlinkability to the diff-equivalence of a
biprocess. ProVerif proves that the strong unlinkability
property is satisfied by our models of the fixed identification,
paging, TMSI reallocation and AKA protocols as described
in Sect. 6 (see Table 1).
7.3 Strong anonymity
In our mobile phone scenario, strong anonymity requires a
system in which a mobile station MSV with publicly known
identity imsiV executes the protocol to be indistinguish-
able from a system in which the MSV is not present at all.
Such a system obviously preserves imsiV’s anonymity. For-
mally, we want the system S, defined as in Example 2, to
be observationally equivalent to the system SV defined as
follows:
SV = new pvN;letpbN = pub(pvN)in
out(c,pbN);
!new sk;new imsi; (!new sqn; (SN|MS))
|new sk; !new sqn; (SN|MSV).
In the system SV, the mobile station MSV with publicly
known identity imsiV can run the protocol. The mentioned
observational equivalence can be translated in the following
ProVerif biprocessPVANON, whereimsiV and imsims are
permanent mobile station identities:
free imsi_v.
let PV_ANON = new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c, pbN);
(!new sk; new imsi;
(!new sqn; (MS | SN)))
|(new sk; new imsi_ms;
let imsi=choice[imsi_V, imsi_ms ] in
!new sqn; (SN | MS)).
The left side of the choice represents a system where
the mobile station with public identity imsiV can run the
protocol. Our fixes of the identification procedure, paging
procedure, TMSI reallocation and 3G AKA protocol as
described in Sect. 6 are proved by ProVerif to satisfy
anonymity (see Table 1).
7.4 Automatic verification results and remarks
We run the ProVerif tool on the 2G/3G identification pro-
cedure, on the 2G/3G IMSI paging procedure, on the 2G/3G
TMSI reallocation procedure and on the 3G AKA protocol,
in order to confirm that the tool would have detected the
breaches of the privacy properties present in the 3GPP stan-
dard procedures. Even though the coding of the protocols
in ProVerif is straightforward, the coding of the observa-
tional equivalences defining the privacy properties in term of
bi-processes is not. In fact the biprocess structure is symmet-
rical, while the definitions of anonymity and unlinkability
are not. We showed in the previous section how we obtained
a symmetrical definition in terms of bi-processes. Moreover,
we had to take particular care in avoiding false attacks that
could be reported by the tool due to its abstractions. Indeed,
we formally define privacy properties through observational
equivalence; however, ProVerif adopts a stronger equiva-
lence relation called diff-equivalence (≈diff). In particular,
diff-equivalence can distinguish between the execution of
different branches of a conditional statement even in the fol-
lowing case:
if a = a then P else P
≈diff
if a = b then P else P
Table 1 ProVerif results on the
on fixed procedures
Properties Identification IMSI paging TMSI reallocation 3G AKA
Unlinkability
√ √ √ √
Anonymity
√ √ √ √
NA not applicable
√
proved to hold × attack found
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1 reduc geterr(err(x,z,y,y))=macFail;
2 geterr(err(x,x,y,z))=synchFail.
3
4 let AKA_MS = new r_ms; in(c, x);
5 let (xrand, xautn) = x in (
6 let (msg, xmac) = xautn in (
7 let ak = f5(k, xrand) in (
8 let xsqn = sdec(ak, msg) in (
9 let mac = f1(k, (xrand, xsqn)) in (
10 if (xmac, xsqn) = (mac,sqn) then (
11 let res = f2(k, xrand) in (
12 let ck = f3(k, xrand) in (
13 let ik = f4(k, xrand) in (
14 out(c, res); in(c, xmsg)))))
15 else (let err_msg =
16 geterr(err(mac, xmac, sqn, xsqn)) in
17 out(c, err_msg))))))).
Fig. 23 Code of the MS side of the original AKA protocol
and hence, although the above processes are observationally
equivalent (P is executed regardless the result of the if state-
ment evaluation), they do not satisfy diff-equivalence.We are
dealing with this issue in our code for the verification at lines
1–2, 10 and 15–16 of the code of the original AKA protocol
in Table 7.4. We check the MAC and the sequence number
(line 10) in the same conditional statement, so to avoid false
attacks due to the evaluation of the conditional. For the same
reason, we introduce the functions err and geterr (lines
1–2) to determine the error message (lines 15–16) and avoid
the use of an if statement (Fig. 23).
As expected, the verification with the ProVerif tool
fails to prove the anonymity of the IMSI paging procedure
and gives a false attack when verifying the anonymity of
the TMSI reallocation procedure. Unlinkability is not satis-
fied by the original IMSI paging, TMSI reallocation and 3G
AKA protocols (see Table 2). In case of the IMSI paging pro-
cedure, ProVerif exhibits actual attack traces. In the case
of the original 3G AKA protocol, the anonymity property
is proved to hold, while the verification of the unlinkability
property fails. Although the trace provided by ProVerif is
a false attack, it does give a hint of the real attack by high-
lighting the test of the MAC received from the network as
the source of the problem. Themodelling of unlinkability and
anonymity into diff-equivalences we showed in the previous
section can in general be adopted for protocols which do
not require an initialization phase preceding the main pro-
tocol procedure. Hence, our method is not specific for the
analysed protocols and shows how to automatically verify
unlinkability and anonymity on a wide class of protocols.
The ProVerif code used for the automatic verification is
available online [81] and in part in “Appendix”.
Note that for verification purposes in our models of MS
and SN,we use randomized symmetric encryption to conceal
the sequence number SQN instead of using the exclusive-OR.
Indeed, even if the theory allows to write a set of reduction
rules to model the xor function, the ProVerif tool cannot
deal with its algebraic properties. The use of randomized
encryption anyway would achieve stronger properties with
respect to the secrecy of the sequence number, and we hence
recommend the adoption of this modification in the standard
protocol.
The model of the TMSI reallocation procedure requires
the use of a state (memory cell) where to store the newly
assigned TMSI to be used in the following session. The state
is initialized during an initialization phase. We use a private
channel tomodel the state. An auxiliary process (MEM)makes
the content of the state available to read and write from the
channel. In particular, the process used for the verification
of the unlinkability property of the fixed procedures in the
presence of the memory cell is coded as follows.
let MEM = in(mem,x);out(mem,x).
process new pvN;
let pbN = pub(pvN) in out(c, pbN);
(! (new sk1; new imsi1;new otmsi1; new mem;
(* memory initialisation *)
out(mem,otmsi1);
(! (new sk2; new imsi2; new osqn;
new otmsi2; new sqn_p;
let imsi = choice[imsi1, imsi2] in (
let k = choice[sk1, sk2] in (
let otmsi = choice[otmsi1,otmsi2] in (
(MS) | (SN) | (MEM))))))))
This abstraction may produce false attacks and non-
terminationproblems (see [82]). For this reason, the encoding
of the TMSI reallocation procedure is not the one you would
obtain with a straightforward encoding of the description of
the protocol in applied pi-calculus. In particular, the TMSI of
a single-session mobile stations is created during the i th ses-
sion of themulti-sessionmobile station and used in the i+1th
session (see lines 105, 108, 156 of the code in “Appendix”.
Intuitively, this gives the TMSI used by the single-session
mobile station and the one used by the multi-session one the
same amount of freshness in the ProVerif model. Hence,
Table 2 ProVerif results on
original 3GPP Procedures
Properties Identification IMSI Paging TMSI reallocation 3G AKA
Unlinkability × × × ×
Anonymity × × FA √
NA not applicable
√
proved to hold × attack found fa false attack
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Table 3 Results of the
automatic verification of the
fixed procedures
Properties Identification Paging TMSI reallocation AKA
Secrecy
IMSI
√ √ √ √
KIMSI NA
√ √ √
CK , I K NA NA NA
√
Confidential information NA NA NA
√
Authentication NA NA NA
√
Integrity NA NA NA
√
NA not applicable
√
proved to hold × attack found
the position of the new construct at lines 105 and 156 in the
code in “Appendix” is critical to the success of the verifica-
tion process.
Authentication, secrecy and integrity The main purpose
of the 3G AKA protocol is to provide mutual authentication
and establish session keys to be used for integrity protec-
tion and secrecy. Hence, our analysis would not be complete
without ensuring that our privacy-preserving version of the
3G AKA protocol still achieves the goals it was originally
designed for. We verify mutual authentication and integrity
properties as injective correspondence properties. We prove
using ProVerif that the original properties of the 3GAKA
protocol are preserved by our fixes; the verification results
are shown in Table 3.
The full code used for the verification of the security
and privacy of the 3GPP procedures analysed in this paper
when run in isolation and when run in parallel is available
online [81]. In the “Appendix”, we report the code used to
verify the unlinkability of all the fixed procedures when run-
ning in parallel.
8 Conclusions
In this work, we presented a thorough (although not com-
plete) experimental and formal analysis of users’ privacy in
mobile telephony systems. In particular, we experimentally
analysed the use of pseudonyms and pointed out weaknesses
in the deployed policies. We showed how these weak poli-
cies make it possible to violate a user’s privacy and proposed
some solutions to strengthen the pseudonymsmanagement in
mobile telephony systems. We also exposed some protocol’s
vulnerabilities resulting in breaches of the anonymity and/or
user unlinkability. We showed with a prototype implementa-
tion that the breacheswe found translate into actual attacks on
real networks. To countermeasure these attacks, we proposed
solutionswhich are realistic and lightweight but require some
changes to the existing infrastructure. The fixes we pro-
posed show that privacy-friendly solutions could be adopted
by future generation of mobile telephony systems. How-
ever, these are not meant to be full protocol specifications,
and implementation details are left for the mobile telephony
operators to specify. Finally, we provided a theoretical frame-
work for the automatic verification of the unlinkability and
anonymity using the ProVerif tool. We used this frame-
work to automatically verify the fixed 2G/3G procedures.
Further investigation of mobile telephony users’ privacy
should be undertaken in order to obtain a complete picture of
the privacy offered by the interactions of the many protocols
at different levels of the stack. Currently, our demonstration
of the attacks presented in Sect. 5 relies on particular hard-
ware/software using closed-source implementation of the 3G
protocol stack and radio signalling functions. It would be
interesting and beneficial for further research in the area of
mobile telephony systems to investigate the possibility of
implementing open-source testing equipment, such as a 3G
base station and mobile phone, using low-cost hardware, e.g.
USRP and theGNU radio software. Furtherwork is needed in
order to confirmexperimentally the replay attack presented in
Sect. 3.9. This would allow to check whether there are or not
mechanisms in place (not stated in the standard) to thwart this
attack by preventing replayed messages from being accepted
by the Mobile Station. Also, a thorough and methodical
analysis of the level of privacy achieved by different pri-
vacy policies would be of great interest. However, this would
possibly require collecting further data about user mobility,
aggregation areas, population density, network coverage and
user base per geographical area. The impact of the adoption
of the proposed TMSI reallocation policies on the network
performances should be studied and related to the level of
achieved user’s privacy in order to carefully balance these
equally important aspects of mobile telephony systems. The
overall privacy ofmobile telephony systems and at each layer
of the protocol stack requires further investigation and would
possibly offer interesting challenges for the development of
formal methods as well. In particular, the proliferation of
location-based services makes the analysis of application
layer privacy highly desirable from a user’s point of view.
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Appendix: ProVerif code
ProVerif code used to verify the unlinkability of the fixed
procedures when running in parallel. Note that the fixed
TMSI reallocation procedure executes the AKA protocol
prior to the reallocation so to obtain a fresh encryption key.
1 (* public communication channel *)
2 free c.
3
4 (* constant values *)
5 fun Fail/0.
6 fun reject/0.
7 fun page/0.
8 fun pagingReq/0.
9 fun pagingResp/0.
10 fun imsiReq/0.
11
12 (* UMTS AKA protocol specific mac and
key generation functions *)
13 fun f1/2.
14 fun f2/2.
15 fun f3/2.
16 fun f4/2.
17 fun f5/2.
18
19 (* New key generation function *)
20 fun f/2.
21
22 (* symmetric key encryption function *)
23 fun senc/3.
24 fun sdec/2.
25 equation sdec(k, senc(k, r, m)) = m.
26
27 (* public key generation function *)
28 fun pub/1.
29
30 (* public key encryption function *)
31 fun aenc/3.
32 reduc adec(k, aenc(pub(k), r, m))= m.
33
34 let AKA_MS =
35 new r_ms;
36 in(c, x);
37 let (xrand, xautn) = x in (
38 let (msg, xmac) = xautn in (
39 let ak = f5(k, xrand) in (
40 let xsqn = sdec(ak, msg) in (
41 let mac = f1(k, (xrand, xsqn)) in (
42 if (xmac, xsqn) = (mac, osqn) then (
43 let res = f2(k, xrand) in (
44 let ck = f3(k, xrand) in (
45 let ik = f4(k, xrand) in (
46 out(c, res);
47 in(c, xmsg)))))
48 else (
49 out(c, aenc(pbN, r_ms, (Fail, imsi, osqn)))
)))))).
50
51 let AKA_SN =
52 new rand;
53 new r_sn;
54 new s;
55 new r;
56 let mac = f1(k, (rand, osqn)) in (
57 let res = f2(k, rand) in (
58 let ck = f3(k, rand) in (
59 let ik = f4(k, rand) in (
60 let ak = f5(k, rand) in (
61 let autn = (senc(ak, r_sn, osqn), mac) in (
62 let av = (rand, res, ck, ik, ak) in (
63 out(c, (rand, autn));
64 in(c, xres);
65 if xres = res then (
66 out(c, senc(ck, r, s))
67 )
68 else (
69 out(c, reject))))))))).
70
71 let ID_MS =
72 new r;
73 in(c, req);
74 if req = imsiReq then (
75 out(c, aenc(pbN, r, imsi))).
76
77 let ID_SN =
78 out(c, imsiReq);
79 in(c, ximsi).
80
81 let PAGING_MS =
82 in(c, x);
83 let (msgtype, xrand, xblob) = x in (
84 if msgtype = pagingReq then (
85 let (xpage, ximsi, =sqn_p, xchall) =
sdec(f(k, xrand), xblob) in (
86 if xpage = page then (
87 if imsi = ximsi then (
88 out(c, (pagingResp, xchall))))))).
89
90 let PAGING_SN =
91 new rand;
92 new chall;
93 new r_sn1;
94 let UK = f(k, rand) in (
95 out(c, (pagingReq, rand, senc(UK,
r_sn1, (page, imsi, sqn_p, chall))));
96 in(c, pres)).
97
98 let TMSI_MS =
99 in(mem, xmem);
100 new mr;
101 out(c, xmem);
102 in(c, y);
103 let (=TMSI_REALL, yid) = sdec(ck, y) in
104 (out(c, senc(ck, mr, COMPLETE));
105 out(mem,choice[yid, otmsi2])).
106
107 let TMSI_SN =
108 new nid;
109 new sr;
110 in(c, z);
111 out(c, senc(ck, sr,
(TMSI_REALL, nid)));
112 in(c, w).
113
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114 let FixedTMSI_MS =
115 new r_ms;
116 in(c, x);
117 let (xrand, xautn) = x in (
118 let (msg, xmac) = xautn in (
119 let ak = f5(k, xrand) in (
120 let xsqn = sdec(ak, msg) in (
121 let mac = f1(k, (xrand, xsqn)) in (
122 if (xmac, xsqn) = (mac, osqn) then (
123 let res = f2(k, xrand) in (
124 let ck = f3(k, xrand) in (
125 let ik = f4(k, xrand) in (
126 out(c, res);
127 TMSI_MS))))
128 else (
129 out(c, aenc(pbN, r_ms, (Fail, imsi,
osqn))))))))).
130
131 let FixedTMSI_SN =
132 new rand;
133 new r_sn;
134 new s;
135 new r;
136 let mac = f1(k, (rand, osqn)) in (
137 let res = f2(k, rand) in (
138 let ck = f3(k, rand) in (
139 let ik = f4(k, rand) in (
140 let ak = f5(k, rand) in (
141 let autn = (senc(ak, r_sn, osqn),
mac) in (
142 let av = (rand, res, ck, ik, ak) in (
143 out(c, (rand, autn));
144 in(c, xres);
145 if xres = res then (
146 TMSI_SN)
147 else (
148 out(c, reject))))))))).
149
150 let MS = (AKA_MS|ID_MS|PAGING_MS|FixedTMSI_MS).
151 let SN = (AKA_SN|ID_SN|PAGING_SN|FixedTMSI_SN).
152 let MEM = in(mem,x);out(mem,x).
153
154 process new pvN; let pbN = pub(pvN) in
out(c, pbN);
155 (! (new sk1; new imsi1;new otmsi1; new mem;
out(mem,otmsi1);
156 (! (new sk2; new imsi2; new osqn;
new otmsi2; new sqn_p;
157 let imsi = choice[imsi1, imsi2] in (
158 let k = choice[sk1, sk2] in (
159 let otmsi = choice[otmsi1,otmsi2] in (
160 (MS) | (SN) | (MEM))))))))
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